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LEGAL TRANSITIONS: THE CASE OF
RETROACTIVITY IN INCOME TAX REVISION
MICHAEL

J. GiATz t

I. INTRODUCTION

Proponents of law reform have tended to concentrate their
energies on evaluating legal rules and institutions and suggesting
that they be replaced by "better" laws or institutions, while paying
relatively little attention to the process of transition. Recent
scholarly efforts to address problems resulting from changes in law
have tended to focus on efficiency and equity considerations which
argue for compensating persons who are adversely affected by a
revision.'
This Article concentrates on a related aspect of the transition
problem-the question of setting effective dates for new rules. Although this question has received some attention in legal commentary, 2 these efforts have largely consisted of rhetorical conf Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Visiting Professor of Law, University
of Southern California. B.B.A. 1966, Emory University; LL.B. 1969, University
of Virginia. Member, Virginia bar. The author would like to express his appreciation to Richard Epstein, Daniel Halperin, Michael Levine, Jerry Mashaw, Alan
Schwartz, Eric Toder, Alvin Warren, as well as Terrence Cuff, Paul Sanoian and
David Seeley, students in a seminar in Federal Tax Policy at the University of
Southern California for helpful comments. The comments of David Grether of the
California Institute of Technology were especially useful. A portion of this paper
was delivered to the Society for Public Choice, a University of Southern California
Faculty Workshop, and to an NTA-TIA Symposium, the proceedings of which are
reproduced at - NAT'L TAx J. - (1977).
1 The classic work on compensation under the takings clause is Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensatiore"Law, 80 HIv. L. REv. 1165 (1967). See also B. Acamaxn~aJ,
PawVA
PToParTY AND im CoNsrunoN (1977). On compensation for changing legal
rules, see generally Hochman, Rule Change and TransitionalEquity in RrmisTumuToN TiouGH Puiuc CHolcE 320 (H. Hochman & G. Peterson eds. 1974); Tullock,
The TransitionalGains Trap, 6 BEr.r. J.EcoN. 671 (1975).
In the context of changes in income tax rules, the principal arguments for
compensation have been advanced by Martin Feldstein. E.g. Feldstein, On the
Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J.PuB. ECON. 77 (1976). See also U.S. DximT oF =
TmAsuRY, BLUEPRINTs For BAsic TAx RErosmu 187-88 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
BLUEPRINTS],

2 The best analytical work on transitional problems arising from tax changes
is Chapter 6 of BLuEPRITs, supra note 1, at 181. For a good short piece on
retroactivity, see Mcntyre, Transition Rules: Learning to Live with Tax Reform,

4 TAx Nomss, August 30, 1976, at 7. A related discussion on effectuating Internal
Revenue Service revenue rulings appears in Note, Retroactive Revocation of Revenue
Rulings, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 91 (1967). See also Galper & Peterson, The Equity
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demnations of retroactivity.3 The recent enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 4 a major substantive revision of the Internal
Revenue Code, coupled with announcements from President Carter
that another substantial tax revision is impending,5 provide an
auspicious occasion to reexamine attitudes about one problem of
legal transitions-setting effective dates for changes in the income
tax laws.
Tax legislation is an excellent vehicle for analyzing retroactivity issues. First, the legislature is relatively free to set whatever effective dates it chooses because constitutional constraints are
few.6 Second, recent tax legislation reflects a wide variety of effective date provisions with Congress using no discernible principle of
date selection. 7 Finally, the dollar amounts at stake when tax
provisions are revised are sufficiently high that practitioners are
alert to the effective date issue and can be expected to argue their
clients' cause to legislators. With that incentive, at least some legislators can be expected to address the issue explicitly and carefully.
Effects of a Taxable Municipal Bond Subsidy, 26 NAT'L TAx J. 611 (1973) (authors
estimate the effects of enacting an elective direct federal subsidy to state and local
governments choosing to issue taxable rather than tax-exempt bonds).
3 See, e.g., Committee on Tax Policy, New York State Bar Association, Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, 29 TAx LAw. 21 (1975); Note, Setting Effective Dates
for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 436 (1970). See
also Comment, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Revenue
Service: Redefining Abuse of Discretion in Section 7805(b), 23 U.C.L.A.L. RMv. 529
(1976).

4 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
5 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, at 1, col. 6 (President Carter reveals part of his tax
reform plans scheduled for late 1977); id. May 13, 1977, § 4, at 1, col. 6 (Carter
hopes that tax reform will not result in any change in the level of government
revenues); id. Apr. 21, 1977, at 1, col. 4 (the President outlines the interrelationship
between his tax and energy policies).
6 For a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional constraints on retroactivity
in tax legislation, see L. Irish, Time and Law: Retrospectivity and Prospectivity of
Statutes and Judicial Decisions 230-70 (Trinity Term, 1971) (unpublished doctoral
thesis submitted to Oxford University, on file with University of Pennsylvania Law
Review). See also Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity in Federal Taxation, 37
TA.xEs 407 (1959); Note, supra note 3, at 436 n.8 (collecting authorities).
7One commentator has noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969), composed of approximately 152 separate substantive provisions, took effect according to 84 different time schedules employing
more than 40 different effective dates. Many provisions were retroactive to one
of 20 different pre-enactment dates. See Note, supra note 3, at 436. Although
no such systematic counting was attempted here, the 1976 legislation seems to contain at least as much variety in effective date provisions, with a somewhat greater
penchant for effective dates that are nominally retroactive. See PmB-NcE-HArm
CoNcisE ExPLANAnoN OF THE TAX REFoRm AcT OF 1976, at 9-15 (1976); examples
cited in notes 20-24 infra.
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II.

DEFINING RETROACTIVITY

Retroactivity in tax legislation has been widely criticized. 8 The
following passage is typical:
If a transaction has been consummated prior to any
suggestion that the applicable law might be changed, the
taxpayer's reliance interest should be paramount.
Legislation made effective only from the date of enactment
both produces predictability and avoids the problem of
Retroactive
selecting an appropriate notice date. .
legislation may provide short-run revenue protection at too
high a price in generating among taxpayers a sense of the
unfairness of, and disrespect for, the tax system.0
Such criticisms of retroactivity in tax legislation have focused upon
"nominal retroactivity"-effective date provisions which specifically
apply new rules to transactions occurring prior to enactment. The
problem of retrospective impact of changes in the tax laws is, however, a far broader problem. A change in the tax law, made effective as of the date of enactment, may also have retroactive effect,
most often by changing the value of assets that were acquired prior
to "any suggestion that the law might be changed." 10 Revisions
having these characteristics will be referred to as "nominally
prospective."
For purposes of analysis it is essential to recognize the similarity
in impact between a change which is nominally retroactive, and
affects the value of transactions that occurred in the past, and one
which is nominally prospective, but also has an effect on the value
of past transactions. One can conceive of cases where the distinction
between a law being nominally retroactive, rather than nominally
prospective, is one day's difference between the effective dates. Such
minimal differences illustrate the inadequacy of the analysis supporting widespread condemnations of nominally retroactive pros See, e.g., articles cited note 3 supra. See also note 79 & accompanying text
infra.
0 Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, supra note 3, at 23, 26, 28.
10 For example, a decision to repeal the tax exemption for state and local bonds,
effective with respect to interest paid or accrued only after the date of enactment,
will immediately reduce the value of such bonds purchased before the change was
announced. If the taxpayer had known that the change would occur, he might not
have been willing to pay what he did for the bond. Similarly, had the seller known
of the future change, he might have sold at a lower price.
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visions, often accompanied by benign acceptance of prospective
rules."
The Treasury Department analyzed the problems of transition
in tax revision in a publication issued in January, 1977.12 The
Department recognizes that changes in the tax law will have varying
relative effects on current wealth depending upon their effective
date, and properly notes that this is also true of most variations in
public policy.' 3 Treasury identifies two problems "requiring
special transitional rules": (1) carryover problems and (2) price
changes. The problems are described in the following passage:
Carryover problems would occur to the extent that
changes in the tax code affect the taxation of income
earned in the past but not yet subject to tax or, conversely,
income taxed in the past that may be subject to a second
tax. Price changes would occur in those instances where
11 Some analysts have recognized the potential retrospective effects of nominally
prospective tax laws, but also perceive differences which are illusory. For example,
consider the following excerpt:
In determining the retroactivity of

.

.

.

a tax, it seems essential to

focus on the economic event being taxed rather than the practical event
which triggers it.
The point is made more vivid by comparing the hypothetical tax on
capital gains with an estate tax passed the same day and exacting revenue
at about the same rates. Suppose the income tax on capital gains is imposed at death on the appreciated but unrealized value of assets held by
the decedent at this death. Suppose further that this tax is applied to a
man who spent his life creating a large business enterprise on the basis of
a minimal initial investment, so that virtually the entire value of the
business is attributable to appreciation in value during his life. If he dies
the day after the income tax is passed, is it retrospective as to him? The
answer seems clearly yes, . . . the tax was merely triggered by a subsequent event; it was measured and imposed upon appreciation in value
which occurred prior to its enactment.
By contrast, an estate tax passed the same day as the income tax and
applied to the same man who died the next day would not be retrospective
even if it yielded precisely the same amount of revenue. The estate tax
is not levied upon the privilege of passing property at death; it is measured
by the value of the property at death without reference to whether any
part of that value is attributable to appreciation. Thus, if both of these
taxes were passed the day before the man died and each exacted the same
amount of revenue from his estate, one of them would be retrospective and
the other prospective even though both were triggered by a post-enactment
event.
L. Irish, supra note 6, at 314-15.
Why is a tax at death on capital gains classified as retrospective and a new
estate tax as prospective, where both have the effect of reducing the value of assets
held before enactment and presumably, in Irish's example, by the same magnitude?
In both cases the decedent will pass less property to his heirs than he had expected.
12 BLruEPnwTs, supra note 1, at 181-91.
13 Id. 187.
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changes in the tax code altered the expected flow of
after-tax income from existing investments in the future.14
The element common to both problems is that relative wealth
has been changed because of the change in the tax law. The
Treasury Department illustrates the carryover problem by reference
to a retiree who has accumulated wealth, (assume from income
subject to the federal income tax) which he expects to consume
during his retirement. If a new consumption tax is introduced, his
wealth will purchase less consumption than if the tax had not been
introduced. 15 The change in the tax law reduces the retiree's
wealth and frustrates his expectations. 16
Price changes occur whenever a change in the tax law alters
the relative taxation of future earnings from an asset. Changes in
relative rates of income taxation will produce changes in asset
values. If the relative rate of taxation on future income is increased,
the value of the asset will fall; if the relative tax is decreased the
asset will become more valuable. A change in the average rate of
taxation on all income would not likely affect asset values because
proportional changes would occur in the taxation of earnings from
alternative assets,' 7 although an increase in the average rate of

taxation would reduce an individual's wealth, perhaps unexpectedly.
Although it may be possible to distinguish some effects described by the Treasury as carryover problems from price changes
in that the wealth effects of the former will not necessarily be reflected in the market price of an individual's assets, the two kinds
of problems are similar in their broadest economic effects."' In the
case of the retiree, consumption will necessarily be less than was
14Id. 181.
25 See id. 182.
16 The impact of the change on the retiree's wealth, however, is the same as its
impact on others with equal wealth and equal propensity to consume. The special
concern the Treasury Department exhibits over this case seems justifiable only if
the length of the time during which one builds his expectations matters or if the
impact of the tax on the retiree's relative wealth is greater than that on a younger
person because of his relative inability to work harder to offset the effects of the
new tax.
.7 See BLuEPUm-TS, supra note 1, at 183. An overall increase or decrease in the
income tax might, however, affect relative prices because demand for some goods is
income elastic. Such price effects are unimportant to the analysis here.
18 Compare id. 182:

In general, carryover can be viewed as being conceptually different
from changes in the price of assets. In the ease of capital gains tax, for
example, the change in an individual's tax liability for gains that have
arisen by reason of a past increase in asset values does not affect the tax
liability of another individual purchasing an asset from him; in general, the
asset price depends only on future net-of-tax earnings.
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anticipated because of a change in the tax law. Where an asset
declines in value because of a tax change, the owner's potential to
consume is also decreased. Assuming the decrease in consumption
in each case is similar in magnitude, both problems should be
treated as a wealth reduction due to the change in law.
Changes in the tax law may affect the price of existing assets
(and the wealth of individuals) whether the effective date of the
legislation is nominally prospective or nominally retroactive. In
either event, expectations may be frustrated. The choice of the
effective date, however, will determine which transactions will be
affected by the change in law and by how much. Subsequent sections of this Article will discuss how efficiency and fairness considerations inform the choice of an effective date. Prior to that
discussion, however, it is essential to isolate the wealth effects of
the effective date choice.
III.

QUANTIFYING

THE EFFECTIVE DATE

IssuE

There may be many variations in the effective date provisions
used in tax legislation, 19 but for purposes of this analysis six categories are postulated:
(1) Nominally Retroactive Effective Dates-the effective date
of a provision precedes the date of enactment of the legislation, the date selected often being the date that a proposal for legislation was announced, or a tentative committee decision was reached; 20
(2) Nominally Prospective Effective Dates-a provision is made
effective from the date of enactment or from the beginning
of the year following enactment; 21
(3) Delayed Effective Dates-a provision is made effective only
after the passage of some time, for example, five years from
the date of enactment; 22
(4) Phased-In Effective Dates-the change is made effective
gradually, for example, one-third in the year after enactment and one-third in each of the two subsequent years; 23
19

20

See note 7 supra.
See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 804, 1013(f) (2),

1302, 2140, 90 Stat. 1520, 1596, 1616, 1617, 1715, 1932 (1976).
21 See, e.g., id. §§ 502, 902, 1404, 90 Stat. 1520, 1559, 1610, 1733.
22
See, e.g., id. §§201(c)(3), 301(g)(4), 2111, 90 Stat. 1520, 1527, 1554,

1905.
23 See, e.g., id. §§ 1052, 1401, 1402, 90 Stat. 1520, 1647, 1648, 1731, 1732.
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(5) Grandfathered Effective Dates-future income from transactions entered into prior to the enactment date (or the
date of a proposal for legislation or of a tentative committee decision) is exempted from the new rules; 24 and
(6) Holder-Only Grandfathered Effective Dates-an exemption
from the new rules applies only to persons who hold assets
on a certain date, but the new rules are made applicable
if the asset is transferred to another person.
Some simplifying assumptions are necessary to describe the
wealth effects of each of these kinds of effective date rules in a
manageable fashion. First, the substantive change is assumed to be
the repeal of a tax exemption for income derived from certain
investment assets. Such a change will alter the relative taxation
of earnings from those assets and is the kind of change which most
frequently elicits expressions of concern about the effective date rule
and proposals for a grandfathered effective date. Such concern is
magnified when a person's investment in the tax-favored asset was
significantly influenced by the existence of the tax exemption now
being repealed.2 5 The Treasury Department, for example, contends
that:
In general, the repeal of code provisions that provide
an incentive for certain business-related expenditures or
investments in specific assets should be developed to minimize the losses to persons who made such expenditures or
investments prior to the effective date of the new law.
policy would be
The principal technique to effectuate this 26
to grandfather actions under current law.
A second assumption is that the change affects income from an
investment asset that is a long-term fixed claim, such as a state or
local bond, and that the asset is not readily substitutable with assets
in other industries which have not enjoyed tax-favored status.
24

See, e.g., id. §§ 204(c) (2), 505(c), 603, 90 Stat. 1520, 1533, 1567, 1574.
In such instances many analysts consider the taxpayer's reliance interest to be
greater than in cases in which a tax provision that did not alter primary conduct
is repealed. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 439. This distinction, however, is not
persuasive. The individual's reliance interest may merely be based on an assumption that he will have a specific amount of disposable income after tax. For
example, the tax increase caused by repealing the extra personal exemption for
blindness would upset the individual's expectations, even though he did not become
blind in order to obtain the additional exemption. See note 77 infra.
25

26 BLu xPrnrrs, supra note 1, at 200.
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These assumptions are designed to insure that the substantive
change under analysis will create relatively significant wealth or
price effects. 2 '
Third, all investments are treated as risidess, except for the
risk associated with a possible change in the law that confers taxfavored status.
Fourth, to facilitate computations, it is assumed that the asset
produces a regular stream of income paid to the owner at the end
of each calendar year, and that the principal investment is repayable
after a fixed number of years.
The example used is a long-term bond yielding annual interest
payments, with the principal redeemable at a fixed maturity date.
Varying the timing of income and return of principal would make
the analysis more complex but would not affect the general conclusions reached here.
Finally, two classes of taxpayers are assumed under the income
tax, with one class taxed at a rate of 50% and the other class taxed
at a 20% rate. This assumption serves to illustrate the effects of a
change in the context of a progressive income tax without requiring
calculations based on a specific rate schedule.
A. The Effect of a Change in Law
A specific illustration of the effect of a change in law using the
foregoing assumptions follows. If the before-tax market rate of
interest on taxable bonds is 8%, and tax-exempt bonds pay interest
at a market rate of 6%,28 with all bonds selling at par value of $100,
the income stream from each kind of bond to each class of taxpayers
may be described in the following manner:
2

7See

BL=EpnNrs, supra note 1, at 185:

Immediate asset price changes generally would be greater for long-

term fixed claims, such as State and local bonds, than for equity investments; greater for assets specific to a given industry (e.g., apartment
buildings) than for assets that can be shifted among industries; and greater
for assets the supply of which can only be altered slowly (e.g., buildings
and some mineral investments) than for those the supply of which can be
changed quickly.
28 This ratio of tax-exempt and taxable interest rates generally conforms with
recent experience. See Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax
Revision: Some Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4 J. LEAL STtm. 351, 359 (1975).
The assumed interest rates necessarily suggest a different rate schedule than that
in the text. In particular, they require a marginal purchaser in a 25%tax bracket.
See text accompanying note 32 infra.
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(1) A fifty-percent taxpayer will invest in tax-exempt
bonds since his after-tax rate of return will be 6% compared to an after-tax return of only 4% on taxable bonds.2 9
He would expect to receive the following income stream:
Year
1
Payment 6

2
6

3 ......
6.
....

..

Maturity
106

If the income from the bond were made taxable in
year one, the following income stream would be received:
Year
1
Payment 3

2
3

3.
3.

....
....

..
..

Maturity
103

(2) A twenty-percent taxpayer will invest in taxable bonds
since they will produce an after-tax return of 6.4% compared with the 6% return available from tax-exempt
bonds. He will expect the following income stream:
1
Year
Payment 6.4

2
6.4

3 ......
6.4.
...

..

Maturity
106.4

When the law is changed and the tax exemption repealed, an
increase in demand for the taxable 8% bonds would be expected.
Fifty-percent taxpayers holding 6% bonds (now taxable) will realize
an after-tax return of only 3% on those bonds, compared to the
4% return available on the 8% bonds, and will, therefore, wish to
sell 6% bonds and purchase 8% bonds. As a result, the price of the
6% formerly tax-exempt bonds will fall relative to the 8% taxable
bonds. Twenty-percent taxpayers holding 8% bonds will not pay
par ($100) for the 6% bonds because they will yield an after-tax
return of only 4.8%. To preserve his 6.4% after-tax rate of return
(the after-tax yield from the 8% bond before the change), a twentypercent taxpayer would pay only $82.26 for the 6% bond (assuming
a 20 year maturity). By comparison, to obtain the 4% after-tax
rate of return available to him from the 8% bonds, a fifty-percent
taxpayer would pay $86.41 for the now-taxable 6% bond (again
assuming a 20 year maturity) .0
The decrease in the price of the formerly tax-exempt bonds
should also affect the supply of those bonds. In order to attract
29

The after-tax income stream for taxable income is C(1-t), where C is the
taxable income generated by the asset and t is the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.
3OThe market price for bonds will, of course, be determined by the marginal
purchasers.
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investors, suppliers of 6%/ bonds will have to sell the $100 par
value bonds at a discount that is equivalent to an increase in the
nominal rate of interest. Because the cost of borrowing has risen,
the quantity of borrowing by the formerly tax-exempt issuers should
decrease.
3
The foregoing illustration confirms the following principles. '
Prior to the repeal of the tax exemption, if there is a continuous
progressive rate structure, rather than the dichotomized 50%o/20%o
structure assumed above, there will be individuals taxed at a rate,
t*, where net after-tax returns are the same from tax-exempt and
taxable investments.3 2 Individuals subject to higher marginal tax
rates will tend to invest in tax-exempt assets while individuals subject to lesser tax rates will purchase taxable assets. The repeal of
the tax exemption will reduce the after-tax rate of return available
to individuals with tax rates greater than t*. The price effects of
the repeal will vary depending upon the maturity date of the bond;
the longer the period until maturity the greater will be the decline
in the value of the bonds. This follows from the fact that the
greatest relative decrease in changed annual after-tax payments,
compared to the unchanged return of principal, exists for those
bonds with the latest maturity date.
Formerly tax-exempt bonds of similar maturity dates will
suffer similar declines in value regardless of the holders' tax rates
since the value of the bond will be determined by the marginal
purchaser whose tax rate is t*. Other effects of the change, however, will vary among individuals depending upon their marginal
tax rates.33 The repeal of the tax exemption reduces the supply
of tax-favored assets and will therefore reduce opportunities for
high-bracket taxpayers to obtain as great an after-tax rate of return.
Thus, future after-tax income for individuals with marginal tax
rates greater than t* may be decreased as a result of the change, even
though the decline in asset values is similar for all individuals.34
Past analyses of the effects of a change in law typically have
concentrated on those persons nominally affected by the change.35
31

These general principles are similar to those set forth in BrlEpmNTs, supra

note 1, at 183-85.
32 In the illustration given, t* is equivalent to a tax rate of 25%.
33 See BLUEPRINTs, supra note 1, at 84.
34

The effect of the interrelation between the changes in the bonds' after-tax

rates of interest and in the market value of the assets is more complicated than

indicated here. Complexity results from the ordinary income treatment given
interest payments as compared to the capital gain or loss treatment afforded to
changes in assets' values. Such factors may be ignored for this analysis.
35 See, e.g., Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3.
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Thus, this illustration has focused on the decline in value of taxfavored investments held by persons prior to the repeal. The effect
of a change, however, will often extend to persons other than individuals nominally affected. For example, depending upon the
relative size of the market for substitutes (and on other conditions
such as the interest elasticity of savings) there may also be a change
in the value of assets that were taxable prior to the repeal. Similarly, the change may affect suppliers of assets in both the taxable
and tax-exempt sectors. Such secondary effects are difficult to
estimate 36 and will vary depending upon the kinds of assets which
are affected by the change in law. For example, in using a fixed
obligation bond as an illustration, one may ignore the possibility
of shifting the loss of income resulting from repeal of the tax
exemption to the supplier of the bond. 37 On the other hand, if the
tax-favored asset were rental property, landlords and tenants might
share the benefits of the tax reduction prior to the repeal, and both
groups might be affected by the exemption's repeal. 38 In addition,
elimination of such a tax exemption would affect the supply of
housing. 39 Because of the difficulty of describing these secondary
effects of a change in law, the detailed analysis that follows will
focus on the holders of tax-exempt assets. This is appropriate given
the concern for asset holders that usually underlies proposals for
various effective date rules. 40 The next section considers the impact
of various effective date rules on wealth.
B. Nominally Prospective, Delayed, Phased-In, and
Nominally Retroactive Effective Dates
The impact of different effective dates on asset values may be
illustrated by the example of a repeal of a tax exemption for interest
from certain bonds. Because asset values are reflective of the expected after-tax income stream to be generated by the investment
in the future, this analysis may be easily performed by examining
the effect of the various effective date rules on the income stream.
36

See generally, Graetz, supra note 28.

37The supplier of the bond will bear part of the burden of repeal of the

exemption with respect to future bond issues. See text accompanying notes 30-31
supra. In the absence of any federal subsidies, the suppliers' costs of borrowing
will increase. These costs will have their greatest impact on issuers who have
developed their financing plans with the tax exemption in mind. See Graetz, supra
note 28, at 360.
3
s See Graetz, supranote 28, at 353-54.
39
See BLma'R-Ts, supra note 1, at 184.
40 See id. 187-88; Note, supra note 3, at 439.
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The income stream from the bond is represented schematically in
Figure 1 where C is the annual interest payment on the bond; P is
the principal payment; t is the tax rate; m3 is the year prior to the
effective date of the repeal of the exemption; mi + 1 is the effective
date; and m is the maturity date of the bond:
Year

1

2

3 . . . mi mi+1

Payment C C C . . . C (1-t)C

m1+2
(1-t)C.

. . .
.

.

m
(1-t)C+P

Figure 1
If the effective date of the tax is a year later, in m, + 2, the
income stream becomes that shown in Figure 2:
1 2 3...
Year
Payment C C C.

m1
.

. C

m,+1
C

n+2 . . . m
(1-t)C. . . (1-t)C+P

Figure 2
The income streams in the two examples are identical except in
year mi. + 1, when the difference in income is (t) C. The effect,
therefore, of choosing to make the tax effective in one year or the
immediately subsequent year is a reduction in income equal to one
year's tax on the annual interest payment. There is no substantial
difference in enacting a change in either one of two years in the
future, although delaying the change will, of course, lessen its
impact by (t) (C). If the period of the delay is extended, the
difference in the income stream will be the tax on the annual
41
interest payment in each of the years of delay.
The effect of a phased-in effective date is only slightly different
from that of a delayed effective date. If the taxation of formerly
exempt income were phased in over a three-year period beginning
in year m 1 + 1, with one-third of such interest taxable in each of
the phase-in years, the income stream that would 'result is shown in
Figure 3:
m,
1 2 3...
Year
Payment C C C . . . C

m+2 . . . m
m1 l
(l-- t)C (I-% t)C . . . (l-t)C+P

Figure 3
The difference between the phased-in effective date and full
imposition of the tax in year mi. + 1 is the additional income of
41 For example, the difference between enacting a change in year mi + 1 or
mi +4 is that in the latter case the holder of the tax-exempt bond will receive
additional income of (t)C in each of the years mi + 1, mi +2 and mi + 3. If one
is concerned with assessing the effect of the date choice on value at the beginning
of the earliest year that the change could be made effective, mi + 1, this difference
in the amount of income should be discounted to that date.
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%(t) C in year m1 + 1, and Y (t) C in year m + 2. A longer and
more gradual phase-in would affect the income stream but not the
42analysis.
The differences in income flows noted above indicate that
delayed or phased-in effective date rules will have the effect of reducing, somewhat, the magnitude of a change in asset values caused
by a change in the law. The precise reduction will depend upon
the delay or phase-in scheme selected.
The choice of an effective date rule will, therefore, have an
effect on the wealth of individuals subject to the new rules. Unlike
the impact of the change itself, this effect is independent of the
maturity date for bonds maturing subsequent to the effective date,
but will vary depending upon the individual's tax bracket.43 As
the above analysis makes obvious, a delayed effective date is more
valuable to taxpayers in higher income brackets.
The analysis thus far has described the effects of choosing one
year or another in which to make a change in the law effective;
nothing has been explicitly stated about the difference between a
date which is nominally retroactive and one which is nominally
prospective. If a change in the law is enacted at the beginning of
year mi. + 2 and is made effective for all interest earned beginning
with the year mi + 1, such a change would be nominally retroactive. The difference between this nominally retroactive tax revision and one which is nominally prospective, taking effect as of
the date of enactment, is illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 above. The
difference in impact is the tax on one year's interest for the year
mi + 1. It has been argued, however, that nominal retroactivity
presents a different case than the nominally prospective choice between year mi + 2 and mi + 3, although the impact on asset values
is similar. Such arguments are premised on the the belief that the
nominally retroactive rule has a greater impact on people's
44
expectations.
42

In order to compare the effects on asset values of the different phased-in

effective date schemes the amount of additional income may be discounted to the
beginning of year mi + 1. See note 41 supra. It should be possible to select a
phase-in scheme and a delayed effective date which will produce equivalent asset
value changes.
43 Compare text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.

44 Some argue that nominal retroactivity is particularly unnerving to individuals
and increases risks in a special way. See, e.g., Retroactivity of Tax Legislation,
supra note 3, at 23-25; Note, supra note 3, at 438, 433-34. From a purely financial
standpoint, however, the difference is that a nominally retroactive rule creates a

current liability in addition to reducing the present value of an asset. So long as
the magnitude of the change is constant, there is no difference in the economic effect
of these two rules on asset values. Nominal retroactivity may also create supple-
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Looking at a taxpayer's expectations at the beginning of year
mi + 1, one can analyze the paradigm case. Assume that at the
beginning of that year, A sold a 6% tax-exempt bond to B at par
value $100. Assume further that taxable bonds of equal par value
were paying 8% interest. If a change is enacted in year mi + 2
making interest on such bonds taxable beginning in year mi + 1,
B's expectations have been upset because he would have either
purchased the 8% taxable bond or paid less for the tax-exempt
bond. The tax-exempt bond he purchased has declined in value
because of the change in the law. Notice, however, that the decline
in value occurs primarily because the tax exemption has been repealed. As noted in Figures 1 and 2 above, any difference in value
due to nominal retroactivity is slight. The repeal would not be
nominally retroactive if it were made effective as of the beginning
of year mi + 2. A nominally prospective change would also decrease the value of B's bond, and B would be relatively better off
only in that he would not lose the tax on the interest earned during
mIl .
If A had kept the bond, the analysis would be similar with
respect to him.45 If expectations are to be protected with regard to

this bond, it must be exempted from the change in law.
would require the enactment of a grandfathering provision.

This

C. Grandfather Rules
A grandfather rule would exempt from the change in law
certain transactions entered into prior to the date of enactment. 4
Such a provision might exempt assets from the change in law regardless of who holds them (grandfathered effective date), or might
exempt assets from the new law only as long as they are not transferred by the holder (holder-only grandfathered effective date).
mental costs primarily resulting from the annual accounting period used for tax
purposes. These include the costs of filing tax returns, and those caused by under-

payments of estimated tax.
45
- Assuming A did not sell the bond to B, if one looks at A's expectations at
the beginning of year mi + 1, the analysis is identical to that in the text. If,
instead, one considers it more appropriate to evaluate the impact of the alternative
effective date rules in terms of A's expectations when he originally purchased the
bond, the difference in impact must be discounted to the date of purchase. Such

discounting would, of course, reduce the impact below the nominal amount of the
tax on one year's interest payments, and this reduction would increase proportionally

with the length of time since A purchased the bond. See text accompanying notes
74-75 infra.
46 The critical date might instead, be the date of announcement of a proposal
for legislation or of a committee decision. The use of such alternatives would not
substantially affect this analysis.

1977]

RETROACTIVITY IN TAX REVISION

The effect of a grandfathered effective date may be illustrated
by returning to the example of the tax-exempt bond.4 7 With the
enactment of a grandfathered effective date, the effect of the change
in the law would be to eliminate the tax exemption on bonds which
are issued after the date of enactment; interest on previously issued
tax-exempt bonds would remain exempt from tax. Because the
bonds are not perpetuity obligations, all bond interest will be
subject to tax after the bonds outstanding as of the enactment date
reach maturity. With varying maturity dates for the bonds outstanding as of the date of enactment, the supply of tax-exempt bonds
will shrink during the period from the date of enactment until they
all have matured. The maximum supply of tax-exempt bonds
would be fixed as of the date of enactment.
With a grandfathered effective date, the value of the remaining
tax-exempt municipal bonds will rise as higher-bracket taxpayers
purchase them from lower-bracket taxpayers. This would occur as
follows, given interest rates of 6%/ on the tax-exempt bonds and
8%7o on taxable bonds, each selling at $100 par value. As indicated
above,48 individuals with a marginal tax rate of t* would be indifferent between tax-exempt and taxable bonds before the change.
Persons with marginal rates in excess of t* would prefer tax-exempt
bonds. With the interest rates specified, t* is a tax rate of 25%.
Following the repeal of the exemption interest on all newly issued
bonds would be taxable. Assuming that the interest rate on taxable
bonds remains unchanged at 8%/, a fifty-percent taxpayer would be
able to obtain only a 4% after-tax return on new investments."
To obtain a 4% yield from a grandfathered 6% tax-exempt bond,
the fifty-percent taxpayer could, for example, pay up to $127.18 for
a bond with 20 years until maturity or $116.23 for a bond with 10
years until maturity. A taxpayer with a 70% marginal rate would,
of course, pay more. A forty-percent taxpayer would pay only
$109.38 for the 10 year bond (to yield 4.8%, his after-tax yield on
the 8% taxables). New market prices would develop for grandfathered bonds depending on their maturity dates.
Without empirical work, it is impossible to know exactly what
total rise in the price of grandfathered tax-exempt debt would
occur, or how the gains from the new market price would be shared
between the sellers and buyers of grandfathered bonds. A study by
David J. Ott and Allan H. Meltzer using 1960 data estimated that
47

See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.

48

See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.

49 This assumes no other tax shelter opportunities exist.
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the elimination of the tax exemption for all state and local bonds,
without any exception for outstanding bonds, would cause an
approximate 12.5o reduction in the total value of outstanding
tax-exempt bonds. 0 While no estimate was made of the increase
in the value of outstanding bonds which would result from a grandfathered effective date, the price effects described above suggest that
a substantial premium might be paid.
If the grandfather clause were applied only to tax-exempt bonds
in the possession of holders of such bonds as of the date of enactment (holder-only grandfathered effective date) the value of the
bonds to new owners would decline in a manner similar to that
when no grandfather clause is enacted. 51 There would be a decline
in the value of formerly tax-exempt bonds to the extent that the
present owners find it necessary to transfer the bonds. So long as
the present owners hold the bonds, however, the interest will continue to be tax-exempt; bonds already issued would, therefore, be
more valuable to their present holders than newly-issued, taxable
municipal bonds.
The increase in the price of grandfathered bonds, illustrated
above, results from the relationship between the yield on taxexempt and taxable bonds, which, in turn, depends upon the tax
rate of the marginal purchaser. The demand from purchasers with
higher marginal tax rates under the progressive rate structure
determines the increase in price. Price increases attributable to
grandfather clauses may occur in a wide variety of circumstances,
however, without regard to the progressivity of the rate schedule.
Assume, for example, that a subsidy is provided to producers of
specified goods. The introduction of the subsidy will typically
result in a decrease in the price of the subsidized good and an
increase in the output of the good. The precise effects of the
subsidy on price and quantity will depend upon the elasticities of
supply and demand of the good.52 If the subsidy is repealed,
50 D. OTT & A. MELTzmr, FEDEnAL TAx T EATm:NT OF STATE AND LocA
SEcurms 88-89 (1963). The quoted figure assumes that the average maturity of
outstanding bonds is 10 years. If the average is assumed to be 7! years, the loss
in value would be approximately 10%. Id. 89 n.2.
51
The decline in price would be the same as with the immediate repeal of the
tax exemption because any new buyer will view these bonds as substitutes for
taxable bonds. Price will, of course, be determined by the marginal buyers.
52 For example, if either demand or supply is very inelastic, significant increases
in output will not occur. If demand is very inelastic, the subsidy will reduce the
price of the goods by almost the amount of the subsidy per unit. Where both
supply and demand are moderately elastic in the area of the initial equilibrium,
prices will decline and output will increase. Cf. R. MuscnAvE & P. MusGuAvE,
PuBLiC FINANCE IN THEoRY AND PRACTICE 444-46 (2d ed. 1976) (effect of sales

tax on output and price depends upon elasticities of supply and demand).
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ceteris paribus, the output and price would be expected to return
to the equilibrium in effect before the subsidy was introduced. If
the products of certain firms are grandfathered, however, so that the
subsidy is continued for those firms, they will enjoy economic rents.
For example, if a subsidy is provided (either directly or through
the tax system) to suppliers of housing, the output of housing will
increase and rental prices will fall. When the subsidy is repealed
rental prices and output will tend to return to the original
equilibrium, but an owner of a grandfathered apartment building
will also enjoy increasing rental prices because he is now competing
with unsubsidized owners. The value of the grandfathered apart53
ment building will increase relative to unsubsidized housing.
IV. EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS CONSMERATIONS

The preceding analysi of different effective date rules demonstrates that criticism of nominally retroactive effective dates has
been misdirected. In the context of a progressive income tax, a
change in the law, whatever its effective date, will typically have
retroactive impact. Asset prices will likely be affected by the legal
change regardless of which effective date rule is applied. The
difference in impact between a nominally retroactive change and
one which is nominally prospective is often slight. Grandfathering
rules do present a distinct situation among effective date variations,
because their use may result in an increase rather than a decrease in
the wealth of an affected taxpayer. This section of the Article
5

3 Theoretically at least, it should be possible to structure transitional rules to
avoid windfall increases in asset values produced by grandfather rules. Phased-out
grandfather rules are one possibility. I am indebted to Emil Sunly of the Department of the Treasury for an additional illustration of how this might be accomplished

through the use of taxable subsidies to previously tax-favored assets. In the case
of repeal of the tax exemption for interest on municipal bonds, an interest subsidy
could be provided for bonds previously issued as follows: Assuming an average yield
differential of 25%between tax-exempt and taxable bonds (as in the example in the
text with taxable yields of 8% and tax-exempt yields of 6Q), a federal subsidy equal

to 25%of the gross taxable yield (2% in this case) could be paid on bonds issued
prior to repeal. The entire yield, including the subsidy, would then be taxable.
Such a subsidy should result in neither a decline nor an increase in the value of
previously tax-exempt bonds. The marginal purchaser would be indifferent in
choosing between these bonds and other taxable bonds. Infra-marginal purchasers
of tax exempt bonds-those with marginal tax rates greater than t*-would, how-

ever, lose their surplus. This mechanism is presented here as a theoretical possibility.
Structuring such a subsidy, even in the case of tax-exempt bonds where excellent
data concerning yield differentials is available, would be a very difficult practical
task because different maturities, discounts and premiums might have to be taken
into account. In other contexts where similar data is unavailable, determining the
proper level of subsidy would be virtually impossible. Transitional mechanisms such
as this will not be considered further here, but they merit additional study.
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illustrates how considerations of efficiency and fairness inform the
choice of an effective date.
In the discussion which follows, it is assumed that taxpayers
suffering losses from changes in the law will not be compensated.
If there is a "taking" of property, however, the Constitution requires compensation. 54 This constitutional requirement limits the
situations in which public policy can be changed without spreading
the costs of change among the population through compensation
from the public treasury 55
A. Efficiency Considerations
Evaluating how different effective date rules affect the "efficient" allocation of resources is a difficult task. Although it has
become rather common for scholars to utilize efficiency as one
normative test of law and legal processes, analysts often leave unsaid
exactly what they mean by efficiency. Martin Feldstein, for example, in arguing for compensation, or at least delayed effective
dates, in tax reform, states that, "Tax changes make individuals uncertain about the future reliability of the tax laws. Their anticipation of future possible changes induces inefficient precautionary
behavior." 56 He does not explain, however, why individual be54
The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The precise
delineation of what is and is not a "taking" within the meaning of this provision
is beyond the scope of this Article. It is assumed that any tax law changes considered here do not amount to "takings."
55 There is also a statute of limitations, which serves as another bound on the
potential impact of a change in the income tax law. In the bond example, due to
the statute of limitations interest on bonds paid or accrued more than a certain
number of years prior to the date of enactment will not be affected by the change
in law. Thus, the statute of limitations, generally three years in the income tax
law, serves as a limitation on nominal retroactivity and on the amount of loss any
one individual can suffer. See I.R.C. § 6501(a). Although § 6501(a) may, of
course, be amended so that certain events more than three years in the past could
be reached by the substantive change in the law, the placement of the statute of
limitations in a section separate from substantive provisions may represent some
barrier (if only because of legislative "inertia') to enacting amendments related to
isolated substantive changes. But cf. Sekula, Retroactive Remedial Tax Legislation
and the Statute of Limitations-The Silenced Claimant v. LR.S., 9 DuQ. L. REv. 1
(1970) (retroactive tax legislation conferring benefits on taxpayers sometimes opens
statute of limitations for refund claims). In any case, the statute of limitations
creates an outer time limit beyond which taxable events cannot be reached without
such amendment. Losses from legal change are, therefore, not unbounded, but
rather are limited by a statute of limitations and by the takings clause.
56
Feldstein, supra note 1, at 93 (emphasis added). Although Feldstein does
not describe why such behavior is inefficient, he generally treats efficiency as
maximizing total social welfare. Feldstein himself notes some of the difficulties with
the definition of a generalized (typically utilitarian) social welfare function, id. 7986, and the concept has been seriously questioned in the burgeoning social choice
literature. See, e.g., Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J. EcoN. LiT. 395
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havior which takes into account subjective probabilities of a change
in the law is inefficient.
Economists are not reluctant to describe a competitive market
as efficient, although it is certainly not unchanging nor even predictable. People typically make long-term capital investments under
conditions which produce expectations that these investments will
be profitable. Nevertheless, tastes and societal conditions change;
technological advances, for example, may render production methods
obsolete. Changes of this sort may be of such magnitude that investors will suffer sizeable losses. An economist would not suggest,
however, that these losses are inefficient. On the contrary, it is the
ability of the market to adjust output to reflect changes in tastes
and technology that is often described as its greatest achievement.
Protection by law of those who invest in a product or process which
is subsequently disdained in the marketplace is not required, nor
even suggested by efficiency criteria. Why should efficiency demand
a different result when losses occur because a change in tastes or
societal conditions is reflected through the political process, rather
than in the market? Those who fervently argue for compensation
(or other protection, perhaps through a grandfathered effective
date) for losses suffered as a result of a change in the law would, no
doubt, be appalled if similar protection were proposed for those
who had invested in the Edsel or in hula hoop production. What,
then, is the difference between market and political processes that
justifies protection only from political change? Such a justification
becomes particularly difficult in the context of a mixed economy
in which the market is so often affected by political decisions.
Efficiency does not require individuals to assess a zero probability of change in the law before they respond to a legal rule.
Changes in tastes and technology should be expected to produce
changes in political output. The risks of a change in law do not
seem necessarily different in kind nor in magnitude from the risks
of a change in market demand or technology. A priori, it cannot
be said that the latter are less random, more predictable. Absent
any convicing empirical showing that the losses from political change
are disproportionately distributed or more burdensome on productive output than market-reflected changes, efficiency criteria seem
(1976); Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation,
20 Am. J. PorrncAL Scr. 511 (1976). Nevertheless, the utilitarian concept of
maximum social welfare is often used as the efficiency criterion for evaluating tax
systems. For a review of the literature, see Bradford & Rosen, The Optimal Taxation of Commodities and Income, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Office of Tax Analysis, OTA
Paper 8 (Dec. 1975). See also Musgrave, ET, OT and SBT, 6 J. PU. Ecox. 3
(1976).
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not to require delayed or grandfathered effective dates. In fact,
efficiency may demand that persons expect changes in the law. In
the market context, only behavior that takes into account probabilities of change is treated as reasonable. 7 Reasonable expectations in the political context may, likewise, consist of only those
which assess some subjective probability of change in the law.58
The Treasury Department apparently takes a contrary view,
presumably on the assumption that government processes do not
represent an aggregation of preferences through a representative
process, but rather are far more subject to control or central direction than are market processes. 59 This view of the government
process would seem to call for compensation for any losses incurred
as a result of changes in government policy. A shift in the federal
budget from defense spending to health insurance, for example,
could not be undertaken without compensation to those who had
invested in the defense sector. Likewise, once wage, price or rent
subsidies or controls were established, they could not be removed
without compensation or, at a minimum, some form of grandfathering. 06 Such requirements would impose too great a burden
on society by inhibiting otherwise efficient changes in government
policies.
Only if efficiency is defined as "Pareto-superiority" is a contrary
conclusion required. The remainder of this section of the Article
discusses this and related efficiency criteria.
1. Pareto-Superiority
Pareto-superiority is sometimes advanced as the appropriate
efficiency criterion for evaluating whether one set of legal rules
5T

The expected utility hypothesis which typically forms the basis for economic
analysis of "rational behavior in risky situations" treats individual behavior as "an
attempt at the maximization of . . . utility numbers" where "[tihe utility from
each alternative is weighted by its probability." A. K. SEN, CoLLErr
CHoic Aim
SociLl. WELFAru 95 & n.9 (1970). See also j. VON NE UmANN & 0. MORGENSTEBN,
TiORY OF Girns AsN ECONOmCc BFw~vrou 17 & n.2 (2d ed. 1947).
Gs The private individual, even one lacking sophisticated counsel in political
affairs, is not without clues regarding potential changes in the law. In some cases,
a law will specify an expiration date or otherwise explicitly suggest a future change.
For example, special tax breaks for the rehabilitation of low-income housing and
for the installation of certain coal mine safety equipment, as first enacted in 1969,
contained five-year expiration dates. See I.R.C. §§ 167(k), 187. Even such
projected expiration dates are, however, subject to subsequent revision. For example,
the provisions of § 167(k) were extended until 1978 by the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 203(b), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
5

9 See BLuEparrs, supra note 1, at 187.
0
G
The Treasury Department avoids reaching the foregoing conclusions, without
explaining how these examples differ from changes in the tax laws, for which

compensation is said to be desirable. See id. 187-88.
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should be preferred over another.6 1 An outcome is recognized as
Pareto-superior to another outcome only if at least one person believes himself better off under the former than under the latter
outcome and no one believes himself worse off.0 2 Efficiency defined
in this fashion would demand unanimity as a decisionmaking rule,
and would, therefore, require compensation from those who benefit
from a change in law to those who lose or, at minimum, that an
effective date rule (perhaps a grandfather clause) be adopted to
insure that no one will be made worse off by the change.63
The Pareto criterion is, however, often rejected as unduly
limiting. While more than a majority vote is required for certain
legal changes-constitutional amendment, for example, 65-unanimity
is virtually unknown as a requirement for change. The rejection
of unanimity as a decisionmaking rule has required economists to
accept less conservative evaluation criteria. A widely accepted
notion for evaluating policy changes is "potential Pareto-superiority." 66 This criterion describes as "optimal" a change from one
social state to another in every circumstance in which if those who
would gain from the change could pay compensation to those who
61

See Ackerman, Introduction to

ECONOMC FOUNDA-TONS

or

PaoPERTY LAw

xiii (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); J. BucHAN€x & G. TurLoc, Tm CALCus or
CONSENT 92-96 (1962); see also A. K. SE,, supra note 59, at 21-22.
62
For a general discussion of the Pareto criterion see A. K. SEN, supra note 57,
at 21-27, 83-85.
63 In The Calculus of Consent James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock argue that
unanimity is the appropriate basis for social choice:
The individualistic theory of the constitution . . . assigns a central
role to a single decision-making rule-that of general consensus or
unanimity. The other possible rules for choice-making are introduced as
variants from the unanimity rule. These variants will be rationally chosen,
not because they will produce "better" collective decisions (they will not),
but because, on balance, the sheer weight of the costs involved in reaching
decisions unanimously dictates some departure from the "ideal" rule.
J.BucmhANA & G. TurLOCx, supra note 61, at 96. Not surprisingly, these authors
have argued elsewhere for compensation to those who lose from changes in legal
rules, at least where gains from post-change efficiencies so permit. See, e.g.,
Tullock, supra note 1, at 678.
64 A. K. Sen, for example, notes:
This method [insisting on unanimity for a change and if there is no unanimity, sticking to the status quo] is one of supreme conservatism. Even a
single person opposing a change can block it altogether no matter what
everybody else wants. .

.

.

Clearly there is something grotesquely un-

satisfactory about a social decision rule like this.
A. K. SEN, supra note 57, at 25 (footnote omitted).
65

See U.S. CoNST. art. V.

66

See Michelman, supra note 1, at 1173-77; Comment, The General Welfare,
Welfare Economics, and Zoning Variances, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 548, 554-60 (1965)
(discussing authorities); cf. R. METER, MICFOECONOMIC DECISIONs (1976)

"potential Pareto-superiority" in context of economic decisionmaking).

(adopts
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would lose, the change would win unanimous approval. 67 This
definition of efficiency "requires only hypothetical willingness to
pay and accept; it does not require actual payment." 68 Thus, if
we limit our discussion to situations where the change in the law is
optimal under such a criterion, considerations of efficiency do not
preclude the benefit of some at the expense of others. 69 Whether
those who would lose from the change should actually be compensated or protected from loss by an effective date rule is left to
ethical considerations and the demands of fairness. 70
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Concepts of efficiency such as avoiding the waste of resources,
often formalized by economists as cost-benefit analysis, are related to
potential Pareto-superiority. If an activity can take place in an
alternative fashion, utilizing fewer resources, it should be possible
to make someone better off without anyone being made worse off. 71
67 This is the Kaldor-Hicks test of optimality. To avoid circularity it is essential
that the losers not be able to bribe the potential gainers to forego the change. This
refinement was added by Scitovsky. See A. K. SEN, supra note 57, at 30-31;
B. MEYER, supra note 66, at 360-61.
68 Michelman, supra note 1, at 1177; see R. MEYER, supra note 66, at 361.
69
It is conceivable that a change might be efficient under this criterion with
one effective date and inefficient with another. Examples, however, are difficult to
conceive; if, for instance, the magnitude of a change were reduced through a delayed
effective date, both losses and gains would be reduced. In any event, due to
problems of information, it seems virtually impossible to identify such circumstances
empirically. Information problems will, of course, be exacerbated by strategic
behavior in a context where compensation is not actually to be paid. In other
circumstances, if the change in the law is efficient under this criterion, it will remain
efficient whatever effective date is selected. As a result, even "potential ParetoSuperiority" will be of little use in informing the choice of an effective date.
7
0 See text accompanying notes 78-119 infra.
71 See, e.g., E. J. MIsH-i, EcoNoxncs FOR Soc M

DEcisiONs (1972):

[T]he rationale of existing cost-benefit criteria is ultimately that of a potential Pareto improvement. Ignoring for the present (a) the difficulties of
evaluation and (b) the problems that arise when outlays and benefits are
expected to appear at different times in the future, the formal requirement
of a potential Pareto improvement, and therefore of a cost-benefit criterion,
is simple.
* * * [All calculations that enter into a cost-benefit analysis . . . are

to be interpreted as contributions, positive or negative, to the magnitude of
some resulting potential Pareto improvement. What is to be concluded,
then, from a cost-benefit analysis showing, say, an excess gain of $100oO0
is not that everyone concerned is made better off in varying degrees; only
that it is conceptually possible, by costless redistributions, to make everyone better off, in total by an amount equal to $100,000.
.
A person who agrees to apply the principles of allocative efficiency needs no new assumption to extend his agreement to the application
of existing cost-benefit analysis. In sum both the principles of economic
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This notion of efficiency suggests evaluating various effective date
rules to determine whether certain of them are more wasteful of
resources than others. This inquiry requires analysis of potential
costs and benefits which might accrue depending upon the effective
date rule selected.
The major cost from failure to grandfather repeal of incentive
provisions should be an increased revenue cost to the government
when tax incentive provisions are enacted. If taxpayers could rely
upon grandfathered effective dates as protection against unfavorable
subsequent revisions in the law, they would require a lesser incentive to enter into the desired transaction than if they must consider
the risk of a change in the law. Absent certain knowledge that a
grandfather rule will protect them taxpayers should be expected to
demand an additional amount of incentive-an "uncertainty premium"-to compensate for the probability that the incentive might
later be repealed. This point can be illustrated by the tax-exempt
bond example. Assume that in pursuing a public policy to encourage individuals to invest in certain kinds of bonds, a law is enacted
exempting interest on those bonds from taxation. Because of the
tax exemption, individuals with positive tax rates will accept a lower
rate of interest on tax-exempt bonds than on taxable bonds. The
rate of interest demanded, however, may be greater than otherwise
expected if the purchaser must take into account the possibility that
the interest on a tax-exempt bond may become taxable in the future.
If the purchaser knows that a tax-exempt bond will be protected
from repeal of the tax exemption by a grandfather clause, he will
not require a premium for the risk of change in the law. Even
assuming that it is impossible for individuals to be certain that a
grandfather clause will be enacted to protect transactions, 2 it is still
true that as the probability of a grandfather rule increases, the uncertainty premium should decrease.
Determining the amount of uncertainty premium which will be
demanded in the absence of a consistent policy of grandfathering
is a difficult, if not impossible, empirical task. The amount of
premium will vary directly with individuals' subjective probabilities as to the risk of a change in the law. For example, if an
efficiency and those of cost-benefit analysis derive their inspiration from
the potential Pareto criterion, and a person cannot with consistency accept
the one and deny the other.
Id. 14-17.
72 There is simply no way to provide complete assurance that a transaction will
not be affected by a change in law. Even a constitutional guarantee of grandfathered effective dates would not provide certainty, since the Constitution itself is
subject to amendment.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

70

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:47

individual assessed the probability of a change in the law to be
zero, he would demand no premium. To the extent that individuals' subjective probabilities of change are equal to or less than
the government's assessment of the probability of change (if it is
meaningful to talk of such a thing), government payment of the
premium would be efficient. The government would be paying an
additional cost which reflects its determination that the incentive is
likely to be desirable for only a fixed period of time.78 To the
extent people are risk averse and the government is risk neutral,
the premium would be increased. One might view the premium
as a payment sufficient for the individual to insure against the risk
of loss from a change in the law.
In addition, the amount of the uncertainty premium will vary
depending upon individuals' estimates of when a change is likely to
occur. Part III of this Article illustrates the impact of various effective date rules by looking to their effect on individual expectations at the time immediately preceding a change in the law-in
effect assuming that in holding an asset, an individual decides at
each point in time not to sell it. The amount of any premium required because of potential changes in law will, however, depend
upon the individual's expectations at the time of purchase. For
example, if an individual at the time of purchasing a tax-favored
asset estimated with a probability of one that the tax-favored treatment would end at a certain date, the price he would be willing to
pay for the asset would be less the closer the date of predicted change
to the date of purchase.74 Thus, assuming a constant magnitude of
change, the effect of the potential change on the amount the individual is willing to pay as of the date of original purchase will be
less the greater the period between the date of original purchase and
73

As an alternative, the original incentive legislation might specify a fixed
expiration date. Of course, the incentive might subsequently be extended beyond
that date (or, less likely, repealed prior to that date). This is not uncommon in
the tax law. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 203(b),
90 Stat. 1520 (amending LR.C. § 167(k) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)) (extension of
tax incentive for rehabilitation of low-income rental housing); id. § 802(a) (amending I.R.C. §46 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)) (extension of 10% investment credit);
id. § 2107(b) (amending I.R.C. § 50B (Supp. V 1975)) (extension of welfare employment incentives). Whether the cost of the incentive to the government would
be greater in these circumstances than without a "target" date for repeal is difficult
to kmow. In any event, specifying a termination date does not eliminate the question whether a grandfathered effective date is desirable.
74 If the fifty-percent taxpayer in our bond example wanted to buy a twentyyear tax-exempt bond, and anticipated a repeal of the tax exemption only at the end
of the twenty-year period, he would be willing to pay up to $127.18 for the bond.
If, on the other hand, he expected the tax exemption to be removed after 10 years
he would pay only as much as $110.75.
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the date of potential change. 5 Where individuals expect that no
change will occur until the distant future, the amount of premium
will be quite small.
Moreover, even if some premium must be paid for eschewing
grandfathered effective dates, the costs of such a premium at the
date of original enactment must be related to the costs of grandfathering at the time the law is changed in order to determine
whether such a premium is wasteful. Paying a premium in lieu
of grandfathering is not necessarily inefficient; enacting the grandfather clause at the time of repeal will not be costless. First, grandfathered effective dates will often reduce whatever benefits are expected to be realized from the change in the law. The social gains
to be realized from the change will often be delayed with a grandfathered effective date. For example, efficiency gains resulting from
the elimination of investment distortions might be deferred. In
addition, among the benefits which might be expected from the
repeal of a tax-exemption for interest on certain bonds is a reduction
in the after-tax income available to high-bracket taxpayers who have
purchased such bonds. As long as high-bracket taxpayers can purchase grandfathered tax-exempt bonds, and enjoy tax-free income
flow, redistributional policies will be frustrated.
Second, grandfathered effective dates often increase planning
and enforcement costs for both taxpayers and the government.
Where different substantive rules govern essentially similar transactions because of grandfather rules additional complexity results.76
Third, the grandfather clause may itself be wasteful compared
to another alternative. Part III above demonstrates that the elimination of a tax advantage by changing the law without a grandV Thus, if we are concerned with the impact of various effective date rules
on conduct in response to incentive provisions, the more distant in the past the
original commitment, the less the taxpayer's present "reliance" interest. The foregoing analysis suggests that either: (1) The date of original purchase is irrelevant
and the issue should be treated in terms of persons' expectations immediately before
the change, as illustrated in Part m; or (2) The date of original purchase is
relevant, and the reliance interest is greatest for those who purchased at a date
closest to the date of change; commitments made in the distant past present the
least cause for concern. The special concern in the literature for commitments
made long ago is in either event misplaced.
7
6 Examples of tax provisions greatly complicated by grandfathered effective
dates abound. See, for example, the depreciation recapture provisions of § 1250
of the Internal Revenue Code. LR.C. § 1250 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended
by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 202, 90 Stat. 1520. These provisions were first enacted with various grandfathering clauses in 1964, and were
amended in 1969, 1975 and again in 1976. See also Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520 (to be codified as I.R.C. § 1023), which
provides special grandfather rules for basis determinations of property transferred at
death.
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fathered effective date will produce losses to holders of previously
tax-favored assets. A grandfathered effective date will produce
gains to such persons. Without empirical work, it is impossible to
know the magnitudes of such gains or losses. Given an assumption
that the change in the law is itself efficient, it would be possible
to compensate losses where no grandfather clause is enacted. If
such compensation would cost less than the increases in asset value
resulting from a grandfather clause, it would seem that the grandfather clause would be a more costly alternative than a nongrandfathered effective date, whether or not compensation is
actually paid.
Significant costs from current effective date policies in the tax
context also result from variations and inconsistencies in effective
date rules. In addition to advising clients as to the likelihood of
change, tax advisors are often called upon to predict the likely
effective date if the law is changed. The costs of such advice would
be reduced by the adoption of any consistent or readily predictable
77
effective date policy.
7 Some commentators seem to suggest that the principal benefit of enacting
a grandfathered effective date at the time of a change in the law results from the
avoidance of "demoralization" costs from making the change. Professor Michelman
defines demoralization costs as:
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue
to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no
compensation is offered [in this case the realization that transactions are not
grandfathered], and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future
production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other
observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected
to similar treatment on some other occasion.
Michelman, supranote 1, at 1214 (footnote omitted).
No one has conducted a systematic inquiry to ascertain whether such costs are
widespread or whether, in fact, they even exist. Proponents of grandfather clauses,
however, often emphasize the demoralization resulting from the change in circumstances when those individuals induced to engage in certain activities through
beneficial legislation find that the activity is no longer favored because the law has
changed and the benefits eliminated. This is a principal argument advanced by the
Treasury Department, BLuzEpniNs, supra note 1, at 181. The Department presumes
that demoralization costs will be less if the rule which is changed is not a rule
which was originally intended to affect primary conduct. For example, repeal of a
specific incentive provision would allegedly produce greater demoralization costs
than repeal of a provision that caused no change of primary conduct, for example,
repeal of the additional personal exemption for blindness. Presumably, these
"demoralization costs" could be avoided by grandfather clauses. Of course, to the
extent that people take into account probabilities of changes in the law, demoralization costs will not occur. To the extent that such costs do exist, they may represent
nothing more than disappointment that a change in the law occurred in circumstances where an individual underestimated a subjective probability of change.
The policy of varying effective date rules, sometimes grandfathering and sometimes
not, tends to increase the occasions when actual losses will vary from an individual's
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The foregoing discussion of various efficiency criteria demonstrates that grandfathered rules are not necessarily to be preferred
in tax reform legislation. Fairness considerations must, therefore,
be investigated to determined whether they form a basis for a policy
of grandfathering changes in the law.
B. Fairness Considerations
Arguments against retroactivity and in favor of grandfather
clauses are often grounded in notions of fairness. It is most frequently argued that fairness demands that persons should be able to
rely on current law remaining unchanged with respect to transactions
consummated prior to the enactment of a revision.78 Determining
what fairness requires when legal rules are changed is as difficult
and controversial a task as analyzing efficiency considerations supporting various effective date rules. Often a proposal is described
by its proponents as fair, just, or equitable without further elaboration. There exists no generally accepted test of fairness that
one can apply to this sort of issue. Nevertheless, perhaps by detailing the arguments and, where possible, testing them against widely
accepted notions of fairness, a judgment about the fairness of various
effective date rules will emerge. The predominant notion of fairness invoked by proponents of grandfathered effective dates is one
of "fairness as reliance." This concept will be treated first; considerations of how the concepts of horizontal equity, vertical equity
estimates. If people knew that grandfather clauses would not (or would always)
be provided when the tax law is changed, demoralization costs would be reduced.
Although demoralization costs are difficult to estimate, they may well be a major
category of costs currently taken into account in the political process. Offsetting
costs from grandfathered effective dates, see text accompanying notes 75-77 supra,
on the other hand, seem to have been less readily acknowledged in recent legislation.
Compare H.R. Rrx. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CoDE CONG. & AD. Nzws 3356, 3360 (early version of § 2005 of Tax Reform Act of
1976, providing carryover basis for property passed at death without special grandfathering rule, will "reduce the inefficiency and inequity of the present system"
of stepped-up bases for such property) with H.R. CoNr. RE. No. 1515, 94th Cong.,
CONG. & AD. Naws 4118, 4251
2d Sess. 612, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Co Ne
(modification of early version, so as to provide special grandfather rules, "continues
existing law with respect to appreciation in property accruing before January 1,
1977, and provides everyone with a 'fresh start' "; consequent impingement on goals
of efficiency and equity, as well as reduction in revenues, are not mentioned). See
also 122 CONG. RBc. S16016 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Curtis).
Moreover, the possible income effect that may result from an increase in income tax
makes any "demoralization" effect on individual taxpayer's productivity virtually
impossible to rationalize. Thus, the weight properly attached to alleged demoralization costs in setting effective dates for tax changes is open to question.
7
sSee, e.g., Hochman, supra note 1, at 322. Hochman argues that "[Transitional equity's] concern is with entitlements to certainty that pre-existing rights and
endowments sanctioned by a social contract will continue undiminished." Id. See
also Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3.
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and a contractarian approach to fairness inform the effective date
choice will follow.
1. Fairness as Reliance
The principal argument advanced by proponents of "prospectivity" in tax law changes is based on the premise that fairness requires protection of persons who might be expected to have altered
their conduct in reliance upon the continued existance of a tax
rule. The argument, in effect, would treat the recipient of a tax
benefit as if he had entered into a contract with the government,
and would preclude the government from disadvantaging such an
individual by changing the law. For example, in 1969, Edwin S.
Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, argued:
[P]rovisions have been deliberately kept in the tax law
over many years, and they constitute standing invitations
for taxpayers to erect new buildings, drill for oil, or embark on programs of charitable contributions. Even if we
should conclude that it would be unwise to continue some
of these benefits or if we should alter some of them, it
would not be appropriate to remove the preference precipitously after taxpayers have embarked on programs
which they might not have adopted except for these
79
provisions.
Arguments of this kind tend to be based on the fact that many
individuals have indeed relied on the expectation that tax-favored
investments will likely be protected or even benefited by grandfather rules if the tax incentive is someday repealed. Grandfather
rules have allegedly been enacted with sufficient frequency that
people now expect them and act in reliance on that expectation.
A set of institutionally induced expectations has therefore been
created, and reliance on such expectations is considered legitimateor even a "right". Upsetting these expectations is deemed unfair.
An argument in this form, without more, ends analysis. Rights
are created and fairness defined because certain institutional expectations have come into place. In creating such rights, this
notion "shields the status quo from normal legislative change with79

Cohen, The Administration's Interim Program of Tax Reform and Tax Relief,
47 TAXES 325, 327 (1969). See also Note, supra note 3 at 439; that author states
that "[t]he primary effect is taxpayer reliance on existing law. In the tax field
precise knowledge of the law is commonly the basis for long-range planning." Id.
439. The author also concludes that "a general rule of prospectivity would ensure
protection of taxpayer reliance and would simultaneously provide a uniform and
predictable standard for setting effective dates in tax bills." Id. 455.
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out anyone asking whether existing socially based expectations make
some larger normative sense." 80 The question here, however, is
whether it is appropriate for the government to continue to induce
that set of expectations or whether another set might be more
appropriate. In this context, an evaluation of the fairness argument, like efficiency-based arguments, requires a determination of
what kinds of expectations are to be considered reasonable and,
therefore, eligible for protection.
First, to the extent that reasonable expectations in this context
consist only of those that assess a subjective probability of a change
in the law, fairness arguments based upon an individual's expectations that ignore the probability that the law will be altered
are not persuasive.81
Second, individual reliance on the status quo as a justification
for grandfathering compels one to inquire whether at some time
so B. AcmasuNa.,
supra note 1, at 105 (1977). Professor Ackerman has pointed
out that this kind of argument is common in certain forms of legal discourse.
If this approach is to be followed, a precise delineation of the currently
dominant set of institutionally induced expectations is necessary. This is an empirical inquiry which will not be pursued here, although it is not likely that persons
expect neither changes in the tax law nor tax increases. Undoubtedly, the empirical
results would depend upon what question is asked. It would not be surprising if
different answers were given, for example, to the questions: (1) Do you expect
changes in government policies which will affect and perhaps reduce your wealth?
and (2) Do you expect the government to remove retroactively a tax incentive
which you now enjoy?
Moreover, it is not clear from the assertions in the literature whether answering
the empirical question is enough, that is, whether the existence of expectations that
tax incentives will be continued is both a necessary and sufficient condition to
produce unfairness if they are repealed. One suspects that the existence of such
expectations is only a necessary condition and that some "adequate justification"
could be advanced on behalf of government action upsetting these expectations. If
this is the case, justification of the government action would presumably take the
form of a normative argument.
In addition, the relationship of this approach to institutions of government is
also unclear. In this context, it is well recognized that no constitutional right to
compensation would currently be recognized and no constitutional right to grandfather rules has been asserted. The alleged right then becomes a right to legislative
outcome based on a "dominant pattern of institutionally induced expectations" when
such expectations have necessarily been rejected by the cognizant legislative body.
The nature of the relationship between "dominant expectations" and majoritarian
legislative institutions is mysterious.
Nevertheless, concern with such expectations explains much of the literature,
perhaps including the Treasury Department's special concern with repeal of tax
incentive provisions which are likely to affect primary conduct, see text accompanying notes 12-13, supra, and the emphasis in the literature on nominal retroactivity, see note 3, supra.
In any event, the assertion that current expectations are the source of a "right"
to be protected has force only with regard to current incentives. It does not address
the question of the appropriate effective dates with respect to the future enactment
and repeal of tax provisions.
81
See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
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such reliance may become unreasonable. If the President proposes
a change, is reliance on the status quo still reasonable? May reliance become unreasonable only after a key committee holds hearings, or when it votes a change, or not until the legislation passes
one or both houses of Congress?8 2 The difficulty in picking a date
when reliance on the status quo is no longer considered reasonable
may account for much of the variance in specific dates in tax legislation. The variety of dates selected increases the difficulties of
planning and adds complexity to the law.
Third, the effect given to an individual's reliance on the status
quo may vary with the structure of the legal rule. For example, in
1972, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,
Wilbur D. Mills, introduced the "Tax Policy Review Act," which
was designed to secure congressional review of fifty-four provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code. The technique he proposed to insure
such a review was the termination of these fifty-four provisions
over a three year period. Mr. Mills was careful to note, however,
that enactment of the Review Act would imply nothing as to the
likelihood of the continued existence of the designated provisions.8 3
Opponents of the bill argued, on the one hand, that it created "a
degree of uncertainty that is unnecessary" s4 in the tax laws, and,
on the other hand, that the purpose of the bill could be achieved
by "simply announcing . . .hearings on whatever areas of reform"

are considered appropriate.8 5 The reasonableness of continued
individual reliance on the existence of the fifty-four provisions
could have been considered to depend on whether the sunset legislation was enacted. Likewise, beginning with the Tax Reform
Act of 1969,86 certain tax incentive provisions were enacted with
termination dates.87 Although incentive provisions are frequently
extended beyond the original termination date, taxpayer behavior
which fails to take into account a stated termination date could be
considered unreasonable. Thus, the fairness of an effective date
82 See Note, supra note 3, at 443-44.
83 H.R. 15230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See HousE Comman-rax ON WAYs
-Aji MEANs, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., MATERIAL BILATING TO H.R. 15230, THE
PROPOSED "TAx Poicy REVIEW ACT OF 1972" (Comm. Print 1972).
84 Administration Request for Increase in Public Debt Ceiling: Hearings Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 321 (1972) (statement of Rep. Byrnes) [hereinafter cited as Byrnes Statement];.see 118 CONG. REc.
20027 (1972) (statement of Senator Hansen arguing that "business investment
would encounter a tax climate of unprecedented uncertainty. The American businessman would become an endangered species.").
85 Byrnes Statement, supra note 84, at 322.
86 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
87
See, e.g., provisions cited in note 58 supra.
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rule might be considered to vary depending on whether a termination date is stated, even though neither sunset legislation nor stated
termination dates eliminate the need for individual assessments of
the probability of change. Reliance-based notions of fairness,
which seem to imply different effective date rules depending upon
the form of legislation, ignore the uncertainty inherent in predicting future congressional action with respect to the tax laws.
Finally, fairness arguments grounded upon individual reliance
have tended to concentrate on protecting those individuals who are
nominally affected by a change in the law. For example, in the
case of the repeal of a tax exemption for bond interest, advocates
of compensation to relying taxpayers would compensate only those
holding tax-exempt bonds. 88 A grandfathered effective date rule
similarly would tend to protect those who hold tax-exempt
bonds.s9 Thus, while it has been argued that persons who purchase
tax-exempt bonds should be entitled to tax-free interest for the life
of the bond, it has not been suggested that issuers of tax-exempt
bonds, who may well have structured their financing plans on the
expectation that the exempt status would continue into the future,
are entitled to continuation of the tax exemption because of their
"reliance" interest. Nor has it been argued that those who demanded or supplied substitutes, on the assumption that the exemption would continue, should also be protected.90 If the fairness
of change depends upon individual reliance, then fairness should
demand protection of all persons who might be expected to have
altered their behavior because of a specific tax rule when that rule
is altered to their detriment.
Moreover, the reliance notion of fairness would not appear to
be linked exclusively to the tax laws, but evidently requires protection of "reliance" interests whenever any aspect of the legal
structure is changed. For example, one analyst of the financial
implications of the revision or elimination of federal regulation of
domestic air transportation has pointed out that deregulation would
s8 See, e.g., Feldstein, Compensation in Tax Reform, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 123,
125 (1976).
89 When the tax-favored asset is a fixed obligation such as a tax-exempt bond,
grandfathering is of no benefit to the issuer. If the tax-favored asset is not a fixed
obligation, benefits of grandfathering may be split between suppliers and purchasers
of the tax-favored asset; for example, a grandfathered repeal of special benefits to
producers or consumers of low-income housing will result in new rental prices.
See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.

90 The impact of the change in law on those who have transacted in the substitute market will tend to vary depending upon relative elasticities of supply and
demand in both the market for the tax-favored investment and the substitute market.
See text accompanying notes 34-36 &note 58 supra.
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have financial effects on the investors, consumers and employees of
air carriers, airframe manufacturers, and airport operators. 91 In
some way each of these groups has relied on the current regulatory
scheme, but protection of their financial stake through grandfathering would not receive serious consideration because to do so would
significantly reduce gains from a change in the system. In a regulatory context in which the magnitude of changes is large, phased-in
or delayed effective dates might be used to lessen the financial
impact of the change on those affected, but grandfathering would
92
certainly be eschewed.
Individual reliance on the status quo simply will not suffice
as a basis for compensation or grandfathered effective dates. Consider a situation in which the President announces a program to
subsidize a certain activity through income tax deductions or credits,
for example, tax credits for the insulation of homes. Members of
Congress crucial to the passage of the legislation make speeches
embracing the proposal. A company engaged in the manufacture
of home insulation materials, in reliance on these statements, purchases additional machinery to manufacture insulation. If the
legislation is never enacted and the manufacturer loses, should his
losses be compensated or should he be otherwise protected? Does
the fact that the legislation passes both Houses of Congress but is
not signed by the President alter the result? Why, then, is the repeal of legislation enacted one year earlier thought to present a
more compelling case for compensating reliance? Should those who
failed to invest in insulation on the assumption that the legislation
would not be enacted also be protected?
If fairness demands protection of all whose expectations are
upset by a change in law, grandfathered effective date rules will
typically be inadequate to the task. Nothing short of perfect
stability of legal rules will likely suffice. Uncertainty necessarily
produces winners and losers. But a requirement that once a law is
enacted it must remain unchanged raises fairness problems itself,
91
Levine, Financial Implications of Regulatory Change in the Airline Industry,
49 S. CAL. L. 11Ev. 645 (1976).
92The reasonableness of reliance seems to relate to the magnitude of the
change. Reliance is generally not considered important when a small change is
enacted. For example, the fact that an individual might have made a charitable
contribution in January, 1977, in reliance on existing law is not considered important
when legislation is enacted in May, 1977, which raises the standard deduction.
Any financial loss would be quite small. As the magnitude of the change increases,
the potential for significant financial losses also increases, and greater concern is
voiced for those who might have altered their behavior to take advantage of the
prior law. Delayed or phased-in effective dates may reduce the financial impact of
such a change. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
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particularly in a system of laws produced by representative democratic political institutions, subject to periodic changes in representation and political leadership.
2. Horizontal Equity
Perhaps the most widely accepted notion of fairness in taxation
is the concept of horizontal equity.9 The classic definition of
horizontal equity requires that persons in similar circumstances pay
similar amounts of tax. 94 A determination whether circumstances
are "similar" or "the same" is, however, fraught with ethical and
theoretical difficulties. The tax literature is replete with disputes
concerning whether "similar" or "different" circumstances are being
compared. 95 The horizontal equity concept creates great difficulties
in that attempts must be made to ascertain whether a difference in
circumstances justifies a difference in tax treatment. Reference to
personal value judgments is often required in order to resolve these
questions. Nevertheless, the basic notion of horizontal equityequal treatment of equals-is widely shared and easily understood.
This may explain why much of the public debate over income tax
revision focuses on deliberate departures from horizontal equity, 90
and asks whether the "injustice," or "horizontal inequity," is over9
ridden by other public policy considerations. 7
If one accepts the classic definition of horizontal equity, testing
the fairness of non-grandfathered effective dates for changes in the
tax law is tautological. For example, if pre-tax incomes are equal
but tax burdens unequal prior to the change-as would be the case
when certain persons hold tax-exempt bonds-eliminating the tax
exemption would improve horizontal equity, and a grandfather
clause would inhibit this improvement.
A factor ignored by the traditional definition of horizontal
equity, however, is that tax-favored status will necessarily affect pretax flows of income.98 For this and other reasons, Martin Feldstein
has rejected the traditional definition as inappropriate for tax re93 See, e.g., H. SIMONS, FEDEnAL TAx REFORm 8 (1950).
94 E.g., L. EIsENsamN, ThE IDEOLoGlS OF TAXATO. 147 (1961).
9

For excellent treatments of this subject, see id. 148-77; W. Blum & H. Kalven,

The Anatomy of Justice in Taxation 23-30 (Occasional Papers from the University

of Chicago Law School) (Pub. No. 7 Oct. 1, 1973).

See aso Feldstein, supra

note 1; Musgrave, supra note 56.

96 For example, special treatment of income from oil exploration, farming, and
state and local bonds, come to mind.
97
See, e.g., S. Summy, PAxrwAys To TAX Brxomi 49 (1973).
9
8 See Graetz, supra note 28.
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vision, and argues that compensation to persons adversely affected
by a change in the tax law is desirable.9 9 Compensation is demanded by Feldstein's definition of "horizontal equity in tax reform" which requires "that if two individuals would have the same
utility level if the tax remained unchanged, they should also have
the same utility level if the tax is changed." 100 It becomes readily
apparent why this definition of horizontal equity requires compensation to those who suffer losses from a tax change if "after-tax
income" is substituted for "utility level" in the quoted passage.
While the grandfathered effective date issue is not expressly
addressed by Feldstein (he does argue for delayed effective dates),
a grandfathered effective date rule may be viewed as a substitute
for compensation. 10 1 A grandfathered effective date would allow
the holder of a previously tax-exempt bond to maintain the same
after-tax income following the change. If, as Feldstein suggests,
fairness demands compensation for losses from tax revision, then
this concept of fairness also implies a grandfathered effective date
if compensation is not to be paid. 0 2 Application of Feldstein's
definition of horizontal equity to the effective date question, therefore, provides clear results.
Professor Feldstein's definition of horizontal equity, however,
is inappropriate as a concept of fairness in tax revision. By focusing
on "utility levels," or after-tax income, in determining who is "similarly situated", Feldstein defines the pre-change environment as
inherently equitable. 08 Such a definition of horizontal equity
necessarily implies that any uncompensated change in the tax
system is inequitable. If change is by definition inequitable, there
is no basis for evaluating the equity effects of tax rules and no
guidance as to when changes should be enacted for reasons of
equity. The traditional definition of horizontal equity, by focusing
on pre-tax income, generally affords more guidance for evaluating
an income tax revision than does Feldstein's definition because the
99

Feldstein, supra note 1; Feldstein, supra note 88.

00

' Feldstein, supranote 1, at 95 (footnote omitted).
101 However, it may be a less efficient substitute.

See text accompanying note

77 supra. This may account for Feldstein's emphasis on compensation.
102 Although the windfall gains resulting from grandfathering seem somewhat
inconsistent with his definition of horizontal equity, Feldstein himself suggests this
result; see Feldstein, supra note 88, at 128 & n.18. Perhaps rules such as those
suggested in note 53 supra would better comport with Feldstein's definition of
horizontal equity.
103

Id. 124.
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very purpose of tax reform may be to alter the after-tax income of
10 4
certain classes of taxpayers.
3. Vertical Equity
Vertical equity is said to require unequal taxation of persons
in different circumstances, and many analysts treat the concept as
simply a different view of the horizontal equity question. 0 5 For
present purposes, however, a more limited criterion of vertical
equity, that dealing with the distribution of the costs of government
(in this case the income tax burden) by income classes, will suffice.
Questions of vertical equity are here limited to inquiries about the
fairness of the distribution of the tax burden by income classes;
fairness concerns raised by circumstances other than differences in
the amount of taxpayers' income are considered to be problems of
horizontal equity. 1' 6
104 Where the effect of the tax incentive on pre-tax incomes can be determined
with some accuracy, this effect should be taken into account. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
105 For example, Musgrave states that:
This principle of equality, or horizontal equity, is fundamental to the
ability-to-pay approach which requires equal taxation of people with equal
ability and unequal taxation of people of unequal ability....
The requirements of horizontal and vertical equity are but different
sides of the same coin. if there is no specified reason for discriminating
among unequals, how can there be a reason for avoiding discrimination
among equals? Without a scheme of vertical equity, the requirement of
horizontal equity at best becomes a safeguard against capricious discrimination-a safeguard which might be provided equally well by a requirement
that taxes be distributed at random. To mean more than this, the principle
of horizontal equity must be seen against the backdrop of an explicit view
of vertical equity.
R. MusORAvE, THE THEoRY or Potirc FINANCE 160 (1959) (footnote omitted).
In his early work, Henry Simons treated the principles of horizontal and
vertical equity as strictly coordinate. See H. SimoNs, PimsoNAL INcom TAxAnON
30 (1938). Horizontal equity is considered of primary importance in his later work.
See H. SimoNs, supra note 93, at 11.
106 Even this limited notion of vertical equity is, however, fraught with difficulties. First, there is no consensus as to what constitutes a "fair" distribution of the
costs of government by income class. Debate continues over the fairness of different
general schemes of financing government expenditures. Income tax progressivity
can be justified as a mechanism for maintaining proper balance in the tax burden
borne by individuals with different incomes, by resort to personal interests and ethics,
as a mechanism for reducing income inequality, see H. SrMoNs, PEnsONAL INCOmE
T.XATIO¢N 17-31 (1938), or by reason of longevity. Nonetheless, acceptance of
progressivity as a valid vertical equity concept does not compel any specific shape
of the distribution of tax. How progressive the income tax should be depends upon
such matters as one's view of the "appropriate" social welfare function (assuming
that it is meaningful to talk about such a thing, see note 56 supra), how one accounts
for differences in abilities and taste, whether one considers an individual's income
to be an "entitlement" or a product of the society, and a host of other factors which
serve only to proliferate valid differences of opinion.
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There are two approaches to testing the effective date issue
against the criterion of vertical equity. First, one might determine
whether the change itself is enacted to improve vertical equity
through a redistribution of the tax burden. Whenever an income
tax change is enacted for redistributional purposes, and is therefore expected (or intended) to improve some notion of vertical
equity, a grandfather rule will be likely to delay or obstruct realization of this goal. The tax-exempt bond example is a paradigm
case. A grandfather clause would produce gains for holders of taxexempt bonds and would enable infra-marginal purchasers (those
with marginal tax rates greater than t*) 107 who enjoyed a surplus at
the time of their original purchase to continue to enjoy an exemption from tax. Likewise, infra-marginal purchasers of grandfathered bonds, necessarily persons in higher income brackets, will
enjoy the same form of surplus as the infra-marginal purchasers of
tax-exempt bonds enjoyed before the repeal of the exemption.108
Grandfathering a change which is motivated by a desire to
increase the tax burden on the class of persons who have enjoyed a
tax incentive is much like passing a law to redistribute wealth and
requiring compensation to those from whom wealth was distributed.
Grandfathering such changes produces windfall gains to the class
of persons presumably intended to be affected adversely. An ad hoc
vertical equity approach to the effective date issue would require
an evaluation of the redistributional purposes and consequences of
each change in the Internal Revenue Code. Repeal of tax favored
treatment enjoyed by higher income taxpayers would not be grandfathered, and grandfather rules would be limited to changes removing provisions which provide tax advantages to middle or lower
income taxpayers. Under this approach, repeal of the tax exemption for social security payments might be grandfathered, but
In addition, the failure to consider taxes other than the income tax, benefits
from government expenditures, the benefits and burdens of government policies
such as price regulation, and inflation, all of which significantly affect the distribution of income, impedes one's ability to thoroughly discuss issues of vertical equity.
To illustrate, the overall redistributive impact of government on the economy could
be increased by imposing a regressive tax, if the proceeds from that tax were used
for specified transfer payments. Looking only at the regressive nature of the tax
would be highly misleading.
These objections are so significant that it must be pointed out that it is impossible to evaluate income tax changes in terms of vertical equity without looking
at the overall effects of governmental action on the distribution of income. Nevertheless, for purposes of this Article, the vertical equity of income tax changes will
be considered with reference only to the income tax, ignoring other government
programs and, more importantly, ignoring the benefits of the government expenditures.
107
See text accompanying note 32 supra.
108 See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
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no grandfather rule would be likely to be enacted if the tax exemption for municipal bond interest were repealed.109
A second approach in testing the fairness of grandfathered
effective dates against the vertical equity criterion requires one to
determine whether a consistent policy of grandfathering (or of not
grandfathering) would improve the vertical equity of the system.
That determination would require that one estimate the distribution by income class of the benefits and burdens from specific provisions in the income tax law."10 It would then be necessary to
estimate how repeal of tax provisions with grandfathered effective
dates would affect that distribution when compared to repeal without grandfathered effective dates. Given the theoretical and empirical difficulties in developing this information, however, an
ad hoc approach, through which each proposal for change is tested
against a vertical equity criterion currently seems best, if vertical
equity is to be used as a test of effective date fairness.
4. A Contractarian Approach to Fairness
Although the traditional notions of horizontal and vertical
equity offer some guidance as to the fairness of effective date
alternatives, it is also useful to examine the various rules in a
Rawlsian fashion, against contractarian notions of fairness."' The
contractarian perspective defines fairness as that set of rules which
would be agreed to by all participants under a set of procedural
conditions designed to insure a just agreement. By focusing the
inquiry at an anarchical or constitutional stage and invoking the
devices of the original position and the veil of ignorance, an
analytical framework is provided for testing the fairness of various
outcomes. The persuasiveness of this methodology turns on one's
evaluation of the appropriateness of the original position procedure
109 This approach would tend to produce results contrary to current practice. A
major difficulty with this approach, as with that relying on pre-tax income as a
basis for evaluating horizontal equity, is the failure to take into account the effect
of the tax incentive in reducing pre-tax income. Where possible, estimates of such
effects should be taken into account. See Graetz, supra note 28.
110 First-level estimates of that distribution have been made by the Treasury
Department and congressional staffs, but these are woefully inadequate for this
task. See Graetz, supra note 28.
1"1 John Rawls' book, A Theory of Justice, has given new impetus to contractarian approaches to issues of fairness, and, in particular, to evaluating substantive outcomes based upon procedural criteria. The original position and the veil
of ignorance provide the procedural backdrop to Rawls' work. J. BAwLS, A THEoRy
or JusncE (1971).
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rather than on the outcome of that procedure."12 The original position eliminates problems of time, location, and individual preferences by invoking a "veil of ignorance" for the parties to the social
contract. The parties are permitted to know general facts about
human society, including such matters as the principles of economic
theory, social organization and human psychology. Additional data
describing society may be provided when a legislative decision is to
be made." 3 The parties are not given specific knowledge about
themselves. They are ignorant, for example, of physical and intellectual attributes, financial assets, current and potential market
productivity, preferences for market and non-market activity, and,
of course, neither party will know whether he will hold tax-favored
or taxable assets.
Two further observations about this methodology are appropriate. First, the justificatory power of the original position
methodology, coupled with a unanimity requirement, stems from a
notion that the right of each individual to equal concern and respect must be enforced."14 To the extent that the original position
contractarian methodology is appealing, this is undoubtedly due to
a widespread notion of egalitarian rights. Secondly, one should not
expect unique outcomes to emerge from this criterion of fairness."15
"12 Rawls himself would likely resist the use of his methodology in this context.
See J. R wms, supra note 111 at 7-11. The original position was not intended to
provide legal theorists with an analytical device severable from the principles it was
designed to justify. Nonetheless, Rawlsian methodology may be useful by analogy
in informing complex social decisions. For example, in the tax context, William
Klein has used Rawls' approach in an effort to justify the proposition that "a fair
system is one that distributes material rewards equally among people who are willing to work equally hard." W. KraaN, PoLicy ANALYsIs OF THE FoEAL INcomE
TAx 26 (1976).
113J. RAwLs, supra note 111, at 137-38.
This illustration is not precisely
congruent with Rawls' description of the "veil of ignorance," but the parties may
need and can be supplied with more specific information than Rawls posits. Rawls'
restrictions on the parties' understanding of their own society are not essential to his
conception of fairness. Rather, the appropriate social facts made available to the
negotiating parties should depend upon the universality of the decision which they are
attempting to reach. Parties seeking to negotiate basic principles of social governance, operative across time and changing social circumstances, are entitled to only
the most general social facts. Somewhat greater specificity, however, seems appropriate in the current context.
"14See Dworkin, The Original Position, in B
nADmNG
AwLs 16, 48-52 (N.
Daniels ed. 1974); Scanlon, Rawis" Theory of Justice in READING BAWLS, supra at
169, 171-79. See also A. K. SEN, supra note 57, at 136-137.
115 See A. K. SEN, supra note 57, at 140; J. Buchanan, Notes on Justice in
Contract, 12-13 (1976) (mimeo on file with University of Pennsylvania Law
Review). But Rawls himself expects unique results to emerge when basic principles
of social governance are derived; for example, he views his "difference principle" as
uniquely derivative from his methodology. Bawls acknowledges, however, that at
the legislative stage, it is not always clear which of several outcomes will emerge
and describes the test in this context as "indeterminate." J. B.&w s, supra note
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A number of outcomes might emerge from this procedure that
meet the test of fairness. "Often the best that we can say of a law
or policy is that it is at least not clearly unjust." 116
In testing the fairness of various effective dates for tax legislation a complete exposition of an original position agreement is
not necessary. All that is suggested here is that the following principles might emerge from a negotiation in the original position:
1. Changes in public policy reflected in legal rules and
institutions will tend to alter wealth.
2. Because of changes in societal conditions, tastes and
technology, the parties will not expect legal rules to be immutable but rather to change from time to time. This requires them to engage in a long-term view." 17
3. Because changes in legal rules that occur
alter wealth, the parties are likely to focus on the
enacting and changing legal rules to insure that
arbitrary. Procedural and substantive conditions
laws will be devised.

will tend to
processes for
they are not
for enacting

4. To maintain the ability of the legal system to respond
to changing circumstances, compensation will be paid to those
who suffer losses from changes in law relatively rarely.
5. The parties may, or may not, agree on a limit to frequency of change-a stability condition.
6. Knowing that there is great flexibility in possible
effective date rules for changes in law, and that selection of an
effective date may alter the magnitude of wealth effects resulting from legal change, it seems unlikely that the parties would
agree to a unique outcome in terms of effective dates. In particular, no prohibition against non-grandfathered effective dates
seem likely to be permitted. In the context of a progressive
income tax, the repeal of tax-favored treatment for particular
investments would be the least likely category of change for
which the parties would agree to require grandfather clauses.
111, at 201. It may well be that whether this methodology will yield unique results

depends upon the precise information made available to the parties.
of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
116 J. kwrs, supra note 111, at 199.

An analysis

117 Id. Accord, Michelman, supra note 1, at 1220-24; see generally Ackerman,

supra note 1, at 227 n.3.
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It is conceivable that parties in the original position might
agree that tax-favored treatment would be enacted from time
to time; but the most advantaged persons, in terms of income,
would be most likely to gain from a requirement that repeal
of such a clause be accompanied by a grandfather clause.
Agreements in the original position would be far more likely
8
to accrue to the benefit of the least advantaged."
7. If a general effective date policy is to be adopted, it
may well be that the policy desired is one which would produce
the greatest total output. This would require that the effective
date rule meet only the criterion of efficiency.1 0
Although these are not the only outcomes that could emerge from a
negotiation in the original position, it is useful to recognize that
118 To this extent, contractarian results would tend to conform to those described
in connection with the discussion of vertical equity, see text accompanying notes
105-10 supra. Agreements which accrue to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society are predicted by Bawls. See J.RAwLs, supra note 111, at 75.
See also Buchanan, A Hobbesian Interpretationof the Rawlsian Difference Principle,
29 Kmmxos 5 (1976). Buchanan states that:
[Tlhe interpretation is more readily understood if we assume that cooperative action necessarily introduces a dramatic shift in the technology of
producing income or product. The jointness aspects of the basic structure
of social arrangements become predominant. By way of a simplified
economic illustration, we might say that the Rawsian model allows Crusoe
and Friday to commence fishing with a boat once agreement is reached,
whereas in anarchy this degree of cooperation is not possible, and each
man has to fish without a boat. The cooperative arrangement involves
participation in the provision and use of genuinely public good. In this
framework, it becomes impossible to impute separate income shares to the
two parties, Crusoe and Friday, since the whole production is clearly a
joint product.
Crusoe and Friday agree to act jointly, to become partners in social
arrangements; gross production increases dramatically, but there is no
means of imputing separate shares.
Id. 8.
Buchanan then suggests that unequal divisions will be acceptable only to the
extent that the least advantaged person is better off than he would be with equal
sharing. The less advantaged person will withdraw cooperation and force the
system back to equal sharing unless work incentives are such that unequal sharing
will make both persons better off. Id. 8-9.
119 Bawls regards his principles of justice as lexically prior to the efficiency
criterion, and argues that efficiency will not emerge as the criterion for determining
the basic structure of society. J.RAwLs, supra note 111, at 67-75. After background institutions are in place, however, Rawls suggests that some questions will
be decided by applying the efficiency criterion. For example, Rawls argues for
a proportional expenditure tax, rather than a progressive income tax, to finance
government expenditures. This argument is grounded in considerations of efficiency:
"And if proportional taxes should also prove more efficient . . . this might make
the case for them decisive .... ." Id. 279. The statement in the text is intended
to suggest only that the effective date issue might be regarded by persons in the
original position as one of those relatively secondary questions to be governed by
the efficiency criterion.
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such outcomes are consistent with a contractarian approach to
fairness. Thus, contractarian methodology serves to rebut arguments that retroactive changes in the tax law are inherently unfair.
This survey and discussion of fairness criteria, like the preceding analysis of efficiency criteria, demonstrates that grandfather rules
are not necessarily to be preferred in exacting changes in the tax
laws. Testing effective date rules against the concept of fairness as
reliance, or the criteria of horizontal equity, vertical equity, or
contractarian methodology, results in no overwhelming preference
for grandfathering nor any other form of delayed effective date,
contrary to the analyses of other commentators.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to describe the impact on wealth that
may result from the enactment of various effective date rules for
changes in the income tax law. This analysis has shown that when
the income tax law is changed, no commonly used effective date
rule will prevent retroactive impact. If nominally retroactive,
nominally prospective, delayed or phased-in effective dates are
chosen, holders of tax-favored assets will suffer losses when a tax
benefit is repealed. The magnitude of the losses will vary depending upon the specific effective date rule chosen. The difference in
impact between a change that is nominally retroactive and one that
is nominally prospective is often very slight. On the other hand,
grandfathered effective dates will create gains for the holders of
assets favored prior to the change.
Although firm conclusions are difficult, given the amorphous
quality of the criteria, neither efficiency nor fairness demand grandfathered effective dates. Recent tax legislation has tended to institutionalize expectations of grandfathered effective dates in the tax
context. This should be reversed. The tax law must remain a
flexible instrument of public policy. When a provision has outlived
its usefulness, it should be eliminated without the delay and windfall gains inherent in grandfathering prior transactions. People
should make investments with the expectation that political policies
may change. Stated termination dates and sunset laws should be
considered as possible mechanisms to induce expectations of change.
If the impact on wealth of such a change is large, efficiency and
fairness concerns may suggest that phased-in or delayed effective
dates be used to mitigate that impact. In any event, phased-in or
delayed effective dates are often to be preferred to grandfathering.

